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ICSC Legal Database - CasesMonday, February 22, 1999 05:01 PM

Case Index:
00107

Citation:
202 Marketplace v. Evans Products Co., 824 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1987).

Issue:
(1) Does the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds bar oral notice of the termination of a written lease where the lease

does not specify that such notice by Tenant must be in writing?



(2) Whether an implied covenant arose on the part of the Tenant not to use the common areas for certain

purposes expressly reserved to the demised area where the lease delineated the uses of the common areas

and the demised premises?

Facts:
Tenant, Evans Products Co., which sold lumber, hardware, storage sheds and heating and plumbing supplies,

leased a storeroom and a retail store sales area at Landlord's shopping center. The lease was for six

successive five-year terms which were to renew automatically unless Tenant gave proper notice of its intention

to terminate. No specific form of notice was required by the lease or the lease agreement. Default by Tenant in

any covenant would, as per the lease, cause a forfeiture of possession of the leased premises to the Landlord.

Landlord's partner and an agent complained by letter to Tenant that Tenant was using undemised area for

storage and was failing to keep that area clear of trash and debris. Approximately one and one-half months

later, Tenant's real estate negotiator proposed to Landlord's agent various changes in the lease. Tenant sent a

written proposal to Landlord's agent which was forwarded to Landlord's partner. Landlord's partner thereafter told

Tenant orally that Land lord would not agree to the changes. Tenant communicated orally to Landlord that,

unless the proposed changes were accepted, it might terminate the lease. Tenant telephoned Landlord and

Landlord again rejected the changes desired by Tenant. Tenant then or ally reaffirmed Tenant's intention to

terminate. One week later, Tenant's agent, in a letter to Landlord, stated that it intended to renew the lease for a

new five year period. Landlord's counsel then notified Tenant's counsel that: (1) Landlord considered the lease

to be terminated at the conclusion of the term due

to the telephone conversation (2) that Tenant's letter to Landlord, stating that it intended to renew the lease, was

an

ineffective attempt to withdraw the termination. In addition, a subsequent letter from Landlord's counsel stated

that Landlord elected to terminate the lease, bec ause Tenant had breached it by violating lease covenants. In

particular, Landlord stated that Tenant had improperly maintained the exterior, used undemised areas of the

premises, advertised in ways prohibited by the lease, and allowed trash and debris to accumulate in areas

where it was not permitted.



Landlord brought an action seeking a declaration of its right to terminate the lease. It alleged that: (1) Tenant

had orally surrendered the leasehold (2) that Landlord had a right to declare a forfeiture because of Tenant's

breach of the lease covenants listed above. Tenant counterclaimed for a declaration that it had properly

exercised its option to renew the lease. The District Court granted summary judgement for Tenant on the first

count and, on count two, entered an order declaring a default by Tenant and Landlord's right to terminate the

lease. Tenant appealed. In a cross appeal, Landlord appealed the District Court's entry of summary judgment

against it on a count alleging an oral surrender by Tenant of the leasehold interest.

Holding:
As to count one: Affirmed. As to count two: Reversed. (1) Where the lease does not require that the surrender

be in writing, the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds, which requires that the evidence of surrender be in writing, had

not

been waived; and tenant could raise the statute as an affirmative defense to an allegation that it has

surrendered. Here, Landlord did not produce a writing by Tenant evidencing its intention to surrender the

leasehold; therefore, the alleged surrender was ineffective.



(2) Although breach of a covenant is required before the Landlord may invoke the forfeiture clause under a lease,

the Court would not imply a covenant to use the common areas for those purposes expressly reserved to the

demised area where the lease delineates the uses of the common areas and the demised premises. In

essence, the Court refused to convert the use clause permitting certain uses in the demised area into a tacit

promise not to use the common areas for those purposes. It held that the rule of construction in Pennsylvania

does not permit the conversion of a demise into a covenant by negative inference in order to sustain a forfeiture.

The Court reasoned that forfeitures are enforced only when there is clear evidence that forfeiture is what wa s

meant by the agreement. Landlord's remedy for the unauthorized use of its common area was not forfeiture but

rather a suit for trespass damages or an injunction. The Court additionally held that the phrase in the lease

agreement stating that "Landlord

will not permit occupants of the shopping center to paint their names or any advertisement directly on any part

of the buildings of the shopping center..." did not constitute a covenant by Tenant to refrain from painting the

exterior of the building but rather constituted a promise by Landlord for the benefit of all tenants. The Court

refused to thereby imply a covenant on the part of Tenant and sustain a forfeitu re on the basis of an implied

covenant.

00107 - Legal Update - Winter 1987